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Long duration, low task load environments are typical for nuclear power plant control rooms, where 
operators, after hours of operating under a low task load situation, may have to shift to a high task load 
situation. The effects of time-on-task and boredom due to low task load will be an important consideration 
for the design of new nuclear power plant control rooms, which will rely more heavily on automation. This 
paper describes a research study of performance in a simulated nuclear control room environment, where 
36 participants responded to an alarm during a 4 hour long experiment where the alarm onset time and the 
availability of distractions were varied. The results indicate that operators perform better in a sterile 
environment and that the duration of non-active time before the alarm influences operator performance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The nuclear industry in the United States, and specifically 
nuclear power plant control rooms, are undergoing extensive 
modernization. Recent initiatives promise construction of 
advanced power plants over the coming years (Schmidt, 2010) 
which will likely contain new controls and rely more on 
automation and dynamic information display methods. The 
operators’ role in the new control room will become 
increasingly passive, in which the operators’ primary task will 
be monitoring the system through electronic displays. The 
operators will have to perform well in long duration, low task 
load environments in which rapid but infrequent shifts to high 
task load may be necessary. Understanding the effect of 
increased automation in these safety-critical environments 
such as nuclear power plants is of vital importance but has not 
been extensively studied within the fields of Human-Computer 
Interaction or Human Factors.  
In long duration, low task load, safety-critical operating 
environments, the switch from a passive monitoring state to an 
active alarm resolution status is a critical event. The operator 
must maintain high awareness of the current operating 
conditions to quickly identify the problem then respond with 
the appropriate actions. But operators encounter these high 
taskload situations relatively infrequently and they may occur 
at any time during a long working shift, including near the end 
of a shift when time-on-task may play a role in performance. 
Previous studies have shown that time-on-task degrades 
monitoring performance due presumably to lapses in attention 
(Schroeder, Touchstone, Stern, Stoliarov, & Thackray, 1994; 
Thackray & Touchstone, 1988). Cognitive abilities such as 
planning may also be affected by low workload conditions 
(Rogers & Nye, 1993), so it is likely that time-on-task before 
the critical switch to high task load will also affect the 
operator’s ability to respond to the events properly. 
Furthermore, these previous studies examined relatively short 
periods of monitoring (< 2hrs). Long duration monitoring 
studies, reflecting current operations in many control rooms, 
and the effects of boredom have received very little focus 
(Fisher, 1993; Straussberger & Schaefer, 2006, 2007). 
Therefore, investigating the influence of the time spent 
monitoring the system before a high workload event occurred, 
on the order of hours, is of great importance when considering 
future control rooms.  
The nature of the low task workload period may also 
affect the operator’s ability to respond to the high workload 
event. In current control environments, (airplane cockpits or 
nuclear power plants, for example), it has been assumed that it 
is best that operators have as few distractions available as 
possible, usually by implementing a “sterile” control 
environment. For example, the FAA implemented a rule in 
1981 to ensure sterile cockpits after accidents occurred due to 
distractions being available. Even within the sterile control 
environment, however, operators may still find and devote 
attention to non-operationally relevant tasks or objects (Barnes 
& Monan, 1990) With longer time-on-task, it is possible that 
the allocation of their attention may shift to any available 
distractions during the period preceding the high workload 
event.  
Therefore, the main goals of this research are to determine 
if the critical event onset time, the operating condition, or the 
attention state distribution during the monitoring period have a 
significant correlation with operator performance, specifically 
in a long duration, low task load environment in which 
operators switch from a passive monitoring state to an active 
control state.  
METHOD 
 
To answer these operational questions, a low task load 
experiment was conducted in the context of a nuclear power 
plant control room. The experiment was designed as four-hour 
control task, to replicate longer duration control room shifts. 
To facilitate this experimental design, a PC-based nuclear 
power plant control room simulator was developed, called 
Human Operator Monitoring of Emergent Reactors 
(HOMER). HOMER was designed and implemented to 
represent an individual nuclear power plant control task. The 
primary task of HOMER users was to monitor the main 
interface and ensure the reactor was functioning properly and 
to respond to any alarm events as quickly as safely as possible.  
Experiment Simulation (HOMER) 
 
HOMER’s main interface displays four control loops 
that form the nuclear power plant (Figure 1). The interface has 
both graphical and alphanumeric symbols that are based on 
current industry uses and standards. The interface is designed 
to allow the operator to effectively monitor the state of the 
reactor. Alarms are directly visible at the center top of the 
display and the state of the valves and pumps can be 
controlled directly by clicking on them. One of four different 
alarm conditions could occur during the experiment and the 
subjects followed procedures contained in a notebook binder 
to resolve the alarm condition. The detailed step-by-step 
procedures were designed to ensure the proper response in the 
event of an alarm condition and be completed in 
approximately 20 minutes. 
A separate monitor, positioned to the right of the 
primary display, displayed other simulation features of 
HOMER, including a secondary task, pop-up windows for 
entering periodic subjective ratings, and alternate distractions. 
The secondary task is a single reactor loop similar to one of 
the loops in the primary display, with which the participants 
could practice interacting with the interface. Every 30 
minutes, a pop up window appeared on the secondary display 
with subjective ratings to be filled in by the participant. 
Potential distractions, like an Internet browser, could also be 
opened then used on the secondary display during the non-
sterile condition.  
Experimental Treatments 
 
The operational questions were manifested in two 
specific experimental treatments: operating condition and 
critical event onset time. The operating condition was varied 
to investigate the influence of the environment on operator 
performance. Half of the subjects operated in a sterile 
condition, where they were not allowed access to any activity 
that was not directly related to the task. The other half could 
access the Internet and were allowed to read or use their own 
electronic devices (e.g., laptops or cell phones) or books. 
Three critical event onset times were implemented (1:30, 2:30 
or 3:30 hours) to investigate the effect of the monitoring 
duration on the performance of resolving the alarm. Subjects 
were equally divided among the six possible treatment 
conditions. The primary performance measurements were the 
success rate in clearing the alarm and the time to clear the 
alarm. Attention states were captured by video cameras 
mounted at the workstations and measured by the percentage 
of time spent directed at the primary interface, distracted from 
the primary interface, and divided between the primary 
interface and another task. The attention states were 
determined by coding the participant’s gaze direction: (1) 
directed at the primary interface, (2) divided between the 
primary interface and something else, or (3) completely 
 
Figure 1: Main HOMER interface depicting four reactor loops. Alarm panel is at the center top of the display. The chat box is at the center 
bottom of the display. 
distracted and unable to see the primary interface. 
Experimental Setup 
 
Thirty-six individuals participated in the experiment (15 
female, 21 male), with a mean age of 22.6 years (18 years to 
29 years old). None of them reported any nuclear power plant 
experience, but all of them reported some comfort in using 
computers.  Participants were randomly placed in groups of 
three within the experiment room to simulate the possible 
social interactions within a nuclear power plant control room 
but each participant was tasked to monitor and control only his 
or her own individual reactor through his or her own HOMER 
simulation workstation. Each participant in the group was 
given a different alarm condition, so they would not be able to 
help each other. The participants completed several different 
activities over the course of the four-hour experiment. The 
primary task was to monitor the primary control interface for 
an alarm condition. Participants were instructed to follow the 
appropriate paper-based procedure to resolve any alarm 
situations that may arise as fast as possible.  
Participants also performed some secondary tasks, 
including recording specific parameters from the primary 
control interface to a secondary interface and rating their 
boredom, workload and fatigue on 5-point Likert scales every 
30 minutes. These scales were author-generated and not taken 
from a standard instrument such as NASA-TLX. This interval 
for recording the state parameters is a standard procedure for 
several commercial reactors. On the primary interface, a chat 
box presented a question every 20 minutes that participants 
were required to answer. These questions represented typical 
interactions with the control room supervisor.  
Procedure 
 
The experiment began with a short briefing to inform 
the participants on the general rules and the purpose of the 
experiment. After the briefing, the participants completed a 
survey to record demographic and personality characteristics 
of each participant. Then participants were provided a self-
paced training period (approximately 10-15 minutes) 
facilitated through training slides highlighting the components 
and possible interactions with the primary and secondary 
interfaces. They were also given instructions how to identify 
and use the correct emergency procedures in the event of an 
alarm. After training, the participants were allowed to ask any 
questions about the procedures. Following a five minute 
break, each participant was seated at a workstation with two 
monitors and provided with a set of paper-based emergency 
procedures and the experiment began. After the 4 hour 
experiment session, the participants recorded their feelings 
about their performance in another survey. Each participant 
was given $200 in compensation and was eligible to receive a 
$250 bonus for the best performance. 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overall, 22 out of the 36 participants (61%) were able 
to clear the alarm in an average time of 51:12 (mm:ss). In the 
sterile operating condition, 14 participants (77%) cleared the 
alarm in an average time of 41:27 (mm:ss) whereas only 8 
participants (44%) in the non-sterile condition were able to 
clear the alarm, taking an average of 68:17 (mm:ss). The 
success rate for participants in the sterile environment was 
significantly higher than the non-sterile environment (Wald = 
3.986, p = 0.046), shown by a logistic regression while the 
average time to clear the alarm event approached significance 
(t(20) = -2.006, p = 0.059).  
The time required to clear the alarm is significantly 
different across onset times (F(2,19) = 6.355, p = 0.008) 
(Figure 2).  A Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that the alarm 
clearance time is significantly different between both the first 
and second onset time (p = 0.046) and the first and third (p = 
0.014). Participants in the first critical onset time group 
succeeded more often than the groups with onset time 2 and 3 
(Wald X2 = 6.518, p = 0.011) with completion rates of 92, 58, 
and 33.3% respectively. Completion rates were higher in the 
sterile condition for onset time 2 (83% vs 33%) and onset time 
3 (50% vs 17%) although the differences were not statistically 
significant. These completion rates for the 3rd onset group are 
likely biased by the fixed experiment duration of 4 hours that 
limited the group to a maximum of thirty minutes to clear the 
alarm. The fact that most participants took much longer than 
the expected 20 minutes to resolve the alarm would also 
further reduce the group’s success rate. We suspect that the 
short training time and confusing format and language of the 
procedures increased the variability in performance between 
subjects. Nevertheless, even the additional hour on task for the 
2nd onset time groups was sufficient to reduce the success rate 
especially for the non-sterile condition. This suggests an 
interesting interaction that distractions have a greater 
detrimental impact on performance as the time on task 
increases. 
 
 
Figure 2: Completion times for each critical event onset time 
group 
Analyses of the distribution of attention indicate that 
subjects operating in the non-sterile environment spent more 
time in a divided attention state (F(1,33) = 7.934, p = 0.008). 
Interestingly, no other independent variable had an influence 
on any attention state. The amount of time that participants 
spent in a certain attention state before the alarm was not a 
reliable indicator of their performance during the alarm 
(F(1,19) = 1.874, p = 0.187).  
Another interesting result from the attention state 
analysis was that participants spent an average of 49% of their 
time directed solely toward the primary interface. Even 
considering the time spent attending to the primary interface 
under the divided attention state (7%), operators spent nearly 
half of their time attending to something completely unrelated 
to the task (44%). For subjects in the non-sterile condition, 
they obviously spent time with their devices or books, but 
subjects in the sterile condition often simply diverted their 
attention to other parts of the laboratory environment. Other 
research has demonstrated similar divisions among attention 
states in long duration, low task load supervisory control 
environments (Hart, 2010). 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Operator performance, in the context of our simulated 
control room environment, is indeed influenced by the 
operating condition, where a sterile environment promotes 
better performance as compared to a non-sterile environment. 
These results support the widely held assumption that the 
minimization of distractions available to the operators of 
nuclear power plants has a positive effect on human 
performance. 
However, the results also suggest that the duration of 
the non-active time before an alarm condition influences 
operator performance. A longer non-active time of just one 
hour has a negative impact on the operators’ performance 
success rate, especially in the condition where distractions are 
present. This suggests that it may be favorable to have shorter 
working shifts, or frequent breaks for operators, though the 
effects of those mitigations in a long duration, low task load 
environment require further examination. The analysis of the 
attention states showed that the amount of time spent in a 
specific attention state before an alarm condition does not 
influence the performance during the alarm condition. Further 
detailed analysis is needed to see if an interaction between 
distractions and time on task is also reflected in the 
distribution of attention. 
The overall conclusion regarding the design of more 
modern nuclear power plant control rooms or any long 
duration, low task load control environments is that it may be 
favorable for operator performance to minimize the amount of 
distractions potentially available for the operators, while 
keeping working shifts relatively short. The attention states of 
operators do shift slightly depending on the operating 
conditions, however, these relatively small changes do not 
reliably predict performance. 
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